The EU’s Defense Initiative Lacks a Clear Plan and Political Support

Europe’s response to the current global geopolitical unrest involves significant rearmament and a fresh era of military collaboration within the EU.

This message of reassurance comes from Brussels and various national capitals.

However, it may sound overly skeptical to say that we Europeans have faced similar situations in the past, and the outcomes were not promising.

Nearly 30 years have passed since the last joint defence initiative collapsed so severely that Europe’s military strength is now at its weakest point.

The 1998 Anglo-French Saint-Malo agreement aimed to provide the EU with “hard power” to complement its softer influence, but it turned out to be an illusion.

The early 2000s’ defence push, which was meant to facilitate EU-wide arms procurement through the European Defence Agency, ultimately proved ineffective.

Furthermore, it introduced multi-national “battlegroups” that remain more of a conceptual army than an operational force.

It must be noted that Europe’s defence commitments are not as feeble and underfunded as critics claim.

Yet, is there enough recent change to instill confidence that Europe can overcome its internal divisions and rivalries?

Both Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have underscored to Europe that its security must be collective, yet a credible defence strategy is still lacking.

While European governments are setting budgets to allocate hundreds of billions annually for defence, they have not clearly defined what is to be defended, against whom, and with which weapons and resources.

At a strategic level, there’s an immediate necessity for a European security doctrine outlining goals and red lines (as discussed in my latest Frankly Speaking article), paired with a defence capabilities plan.

Europe’s “coalition of the willing” may eventually need to deploy peacekeeping “boots on the ground” in Ukraine, although significant weaknesses persist.

The UK and France are at odds regarding their soldiers’ rules of engagement—should these serve to deter Russian attacks or respond to them?

Regarding capability shortages, Europeans would need to rely on the US for intelligence, various weapon systems, and logistical support.

The uncertainties related to a “trip wire” force in Ukraine highlight the critical elements of a defence and rearmament plan that have yet to gain consensus among Europeans.

Discussions on the necessity of drones and AI overshadowing conventional weapons, the intricate process of reducing reliance on US control, and equitable distribution of joint weapons projects remain contentious among many European governments.

On a more optimistic note, it should be acknowledged that Europe’s defence commitments are not as frail and underfunded as critics assert.

NATO’s European members allocate a comparable amount to security as the United States and have made up for their dependence on US military presence through substantial procurement of American weaponry.

Europe’s vulnerability lies in the disunity of its armed forces and the protection that national governments afford their own defence industries.

A recent report to the Pentagon from the leading US security think tank RAND calculated all costs within NATO, revealing that Europeans shoulder a burden comparable to that of the US.

It pointed out that the commonly referenced percentage of GDP spent on defence can misrepresent the reality, as it overlooks significant indirect expenses.

When expenses for peacekeeping missions and expensive economic sanctions are included alongside direct defence spending, the collective balance for worldwide security in partnership with the US appears quite different.

Europeans contribute 38% of it; Asian, Arab, and Latin American allies account for 23%, while America’s portion is at 39%.

“This isn’t a flashing red sign that we’re being taken to the cleaners,” commented the RAND researchers.

Europe’s fragility stems from the fragmentation of its armed forces and the protections national governments provide for their respective defence industries.

EU governments, including the UK, must commit to much closer collaboration.

Their promised defence spending could become meaningless if they continue national procurements that duplicate weapons systems.

The European Commission has proposed that the EU’s plan for joint defence funding be accompanied by a new Brussels-based procurement authority.

This suggestion met with considerable backlash from national capitals and their domestic defence industry champions.

Europe’s armament manufacturers hold a significant share of the global arms market and resist any initiatives that threaten to dilute their position.

Nevertheless, it is evident that Europe cannot simply patch together various national frameworks into a coherent entity.

A centralized approach to rearmament is necessary, incorporating a revolutionary plan to outline the roles and responsibilities of each country.

Another concerning issue in Europe’s defence awakening is the lack of political discussion at both EU and national levels.

It appears governments assume that popular support for Ukraine correlates with broad backing for defence spending, which could potentially impact social benefits and financial stability.

Populist parties across Europe are gradually moving closer to power and could disrupt the joint defence initiatives.

In addition to detailing their rearmament strategies, EU governments must encourage public dialogue to establish a mandate for action.

*The views expressed in this Frankly Speaking op-ed reflect those of the author and not of Friends of Europe.

*This article first appeared on the Friends of Europe website and is reproduced with kind permission.

*The views expressed by the author of this article, Giles Merritt, are not necessarily those of The Bulrushes.